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SAFETY IN THE SKY: WILL REFORMING AND
RESTRUCTURING THE TSA IMPROVE OUR SECURITY
OR MERELY INFRINGE ON OUR RIGHTS?
KATHERINE A. LOWE*
INTRODUCTION
THE DEADLY TERRORIST ATTACKS of September 11,2001, were devastating proof that our airport and airline se-
curity needed a major overhaul. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) was then created to “protect the nation’s
transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for peo-
ple and commerce.”1 The TSA’s goal was, and still is, to “provide
the most effective transportation security in the most efficient
way as a high performing counterterrorism organization.”2 Now
TSA is responsible for security operations at roughly 440 com-
mercial airports throughout the United States, which include
the screening of individuals, carry-on items, and checked lug-
gage.3 The threat of terrorism in this environment is ever-pre-
sent and ever-changing; our security protocol must be even
more so.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2017; B.S., Strategic
Communications and Political Science, Oklahoma State University, 2014. The
author is the recipient of the 2016 International Aviation Womens Association
(IAWA) SMU Dedman School of Law Scholarship. The author would like to
thank her family for introducing her to the aviation industry and both her friends
and family for their love and encouragement.
1 Mission, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/about/tsa-mission
[https://perma.cc/42DH-FU57].
2 Id.
3 Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act: Examining Remaining Challenges:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of the H. Comm. of Homeland Sec., 114th
Cong. 1 (2016), https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/transportation-security-ac
quisition-reform-act-examining-remaining-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/TP7P-
SW3S] (statement of Michele Mackin, Director, Office of Acquisition and Sourc-
ing Management, Government Accountability Office).
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Since 2011, TSA has published an annual year-end review on
its website.4 According to its 2015 report, TSA personnel
screened more than 708 million passengers, which is up more
than 40 million passengers from 2014.5 This computes to
roughly 1.9 million passengers per day.6 Along with passengers,
TSA screened about 1.6 billion carry-on bags, 432 million
checked items, and 12.9 million airport employees.7 In these
screenings, TSA discovered 2,653 firearms in carry-on bags
within 236 airports, up from 2,212 in 2014, 1,813 in 2013, and
1,556 in 2012.8 Of those discovered, eighty-three percent were
loaded.9 Along with firearms, TSA confiscated other dangerous
devices such as grenades, gunpowder, ammunition, fake explo-
sives (which are prohibited because they cause unnecessary dis-
turbance), knives, and other prohibited items.10 But these
statistics beg the question: how many prohibited items were not
found?
This Comment addresses the issues that the TSA faces, the
current and proposed changes to overcome these issues, and
the implications for the airline industry and the traveling public.
Part I addresses the background of the TSA and related legisla-
tion, specifically how changes have occurred and what repercus-
sions resulted. Part II explains the current state of the law and
the projected modifications, including policy reasons. Part III
discusses how the changes affect airlines and individuals travel-
ing through the airports and what the changes mean for in-
creased safety. Finally, Part IV concludes with the future of TSA
reform and potential recommendations. This Comment is lim-
ited to assessment of domestic security and does not address the
risk of foreign flights into the United States or how the TSA
plans to mitigate such in-bound risk.
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE TSA AND ITS ABILITY
TO MAKE US SAFER
A. SECURITY BEFORE TSA AND INTRODUCTION OF THE TSA
Before the government standardized airport security with the
TSA, anyone could meet a friend or family member at their arri-
val gate with a security voucher from a ticket agent; it was not
necessary to actually be traveling to get through security. On the
plane, the cockpit door sometimes remained open during flight,
and children could be invited to see the controls. With regard to
security personnel, screeners were hired by the airlines but
lacked necessary basic training.11 Unattractive wages and bene-
fits resulted in hiring inexperienced workers, with “turnover
rates exceed[ing] 100[%] a year at most large airports.”12 Test-
ing in May 2000 also revealed that fake credentials allowed un-
dercover agents to access secure areas and bypass security
checkpoints in seventy percent of the tests.13 There were also no
regulations in place to deal with employee or passenger back-
ground checks, which exposed airports, airplanes, and passen-
gers to many potential threats.14
Everything changed with the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001.15 Security became a major topic of discussion, and se-
curity professionals became “major defenses to the terrorism
threat.”16 In response, Congress and President George W. Bush
reacted quickly and efficiently, enacting the Aviation and Trans-
portation Security Act on November 19, 2001.17 It created the
TSA under the Department of Transportation and gave the TSA
responsibility for security in transportation related to, but not
limited to, “civil aviation security, and related research and de-
velopment activities.”18 Twenty billion dollars was allotted to up-
grade intelligence and security measures, including “stricter
background checks and . . . tougher security requirements on
11 Alycia B. Taylor & Sara Steedman, The Evolution of Airline Security Since 9/11,








17 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 114).
18 Id.; Mission, supra note 1.
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baggage checks.”19 The idea was to prevent such attacks from
happening in the future, but it has proved to be a daunting and
difficult task. The TSA has yet to be completely successful.20 Im-
mediately following creation of the TSA, 65,000 federal person-
nel were employed to staff the new agency.21 Congress later
passed the Homeland Security Act, which moved the TSA from
under the Department of Transportation to under the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS).22
The changes in security happened fast.23 The short-term goals
involved implementation of criminal background checks on
750,000 airport employees, more law enforcement, a screening
plan for all checked baggage—including X-ray machines and
hand inspections, a larger air marshal program with more of-
ficers on flights, and a more vigorous and inclusive pre-screen-
ing program with more cross-checking with FBI and other watch
lists for suspicious passengers.24 These short-term goals were to
be implemented within TSA’s first year of operation.25 The long-
term goals involved the creation of the new agency “to oversee
all transportation security measures,” and the requirement that
“all 28,000 airport baggage screeners [be] federal workers, all
checked baggage [be] inspected with explosives detection ma-
chines, [and] Trusted-passenger programs [be] implemented,
using new technologies to identify passengers and expedite
screening.”26 TSA implemented hand searches of luggage, pat-
downs or wand searches of passengers along with walk-through
detectors, vehicle checks for explosives, government-issued ID
checks for each passenger at multiple points in the airport, re-
quirements that only those with tickets could pass through se-
curity to the gate area, and limitations of only one carry-on item
and one personal item per passenger.27
19 Taylor & Steedman, supra note 11.
20 TSA: Security Gaps: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
114th Cong. 1–3 (2015), https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/tsa-security-gaps/
[https://perma.cc/X5T4-EBG5] (statement of Peter Neffenger, Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security); see
Mission, supra note 1.





26 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
27 Id.
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B. PAST SECURITY PROBLEMS FACED BY THE TSA
AND RESPONSES
Airports are targets for terrorism, so the success of TSA is very
important.28 Since September 11, 2001, the TSA has faced many
unique security threats, and Congress has had to amend TSA’s
scope and authority to keep ahead of these threats.
Since the beginning of TSA, passengers have grumbled about
the hoops they are forced to jump through and the time-con-
suming processes of security screening, despite knowing that
these procedures are in place to keep them safe.29 In an effort to
alleviate some of this stress for frequent travelers, TSA started its
PreP✓® Program (PreCheck) in 2011 to expedite approved pas-
sengers through security, ideally for the frequent business trav-
eler.30 These passengers save time by not removing shoes, belts,
or light jackets, and leaving laptops and liquids in their bags.31
The approval process includes an application, an appointment
for providing fingerprints and official identification documenta-
tion, and a fee of eighty-five dollars.32 The status lasts for five
years.33 Other trusted traveler programs, such as Global Entry
and NEXUS, can participate in PreCheck without separate en-
rollment.34 But the program is not without its pitfalls.
TSA has been allowing non-enrolled passengers to use
PreCheck lanes, frustrating paying members by allowing other
passengers to access the benefit without undergoing enroll-
ment.35 This specifically happened to a group of early-morning
passengers at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas in January 2014.36
The TSA declared two security lines as PreCheck lines and al-
28 Examining Critical Security Measures, Communications, and Response at our Na-
tion’s Airports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. and the Subcomm. on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 114th Cong. 1–3
(2015), https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/examining-critical-security-mea-
sures-communications-and-response-at-our-nations-airports/ [https://perma.cc/
92GQ-9357] (opening statement of Rep. John Katko, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Transp. Sec.).
29 Charisse Jones, TSA PreCheck Changes Ease Lines for Some, USA TODAY (Oct.








36 Chris Morran, TSA Just Decides Everyone in My Line is Qualified for Expedited
Screening, CONSUMERIST (Jan. 13, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/01/13/
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lowed all passengers already in those lanes to proceed through
the security checkpoint without following the usual security re-
quirements.37 Although the passengers were relieved to travel
through security with ease, many were unsettled with the idea
that random groups of unscreened travelers were considered as
low-risk as the pre-vetted PreCheck members.38 The process was
used both to expedite the screening process and to act as a mar-
keting tool to increase awareness and enrollment in PreCheck.39
A TSA representative explained the situation as a procedural
normality, saying that TSA “also utilizes [PreCheck] lanes dur-
ing certain times for other low-risk passengers who are identi-
fied through a real-time threat assessment process.”40 This “real-
time threat assessment process” is called “Managed Inclusion.”41
It involves two parts: Behavioral Detection Officers (BDOs) and
Passenger Screening Canines.42 BDOs are a subset of TSA of-
ficers who are specially trained to observe passengers moving
through security lines, checking for unusual behavior.43 The
canines are used to sniff for explosives and residue on passen-
gers as they walk through the lines; identification from one of
these canines would trigger a BDO to direct the passenger to
enhanced screening.44 The process also involves an electronic
mat that assigns each individual passenger either regular screen-
ing or PreCheck, despite no trigger from either BDOs or
canines.45 But that was not what happened in Las Vegas; there
were no canines and no electronic mat.46 This was just one ex-
ample where TSA limited its security protocol in an effort to be





39 Grant Martin, 5 Simple Things the TSA Still Needs to Fix in 2016, SKIFT (Dec. 28,
2015, 7:30 AM), http://skift.com/2015/12/28/5-simple-things-the-tsa-still-needs-
to-fix-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/3RC8-M63B].
40 Morran, supra note 36.
41 Id.
42 Id.; TSA, Managed Inclusion, YOUTUBE (Feb.5, 2013), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=C6bwz8RcimI [https://perma.cc/HL23-Q678].
43 Michael W. Chapman, TSA Spent $900 Million on Behavior Detection Officers
Who Detected 0 Terrorists, CNSNEWS.COM (Nov. 25, 2013, 6:14 PM), http://cnsnews
.com/news/article/michael-w-chapman/tsa-spent-900-million-behavior-detec-
tion-officers-who-detected-0 [https://perma.cc/3KPX-9XU9].
44 Morran, supra note 36; TSA, supra note 42.
45 Morran, supra note 36; TSA, supra note 42.
46 Morran, supra note 36.
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gram described by some as “only slightly more accurate than a
coin flip,” passengers prefer safety above expedition.47 The pro-
gram has been phased out, and the reasons and explanations
will be discussed further in Parts II and III.
After implementation of the TSA, there had not been a live
emergency situation at an airport but until November 1, 2013.48
A gunman entered the Los Angeles International Airport, pul-
led an assault rifle from his bag, and started shooting.49 The
gunman, Paul Ciancia, was wounded when subdued by airport
police, but he survived and agreed to plead guilty to all federal
charges, which carry a mandatory life sentence among other
penalties.50 Ciancia targeted TSA employees, as evidenced by a
hand-written note found in his duffel bag that said he wanted to
“instill fear into their traitorous minds.”51 The result was the
death of one TSA agent, Gerardo Hernandez, and two others
injured.52 Hernandez was the first TSA agent to be killed in ac-
tion since TSA’s creation.53 But such a death and injury toll was
small considering what could have happened; law enforcement
officials stated that “Ciancia had five fully loaded magazines on
his person and that ammo was found in a bag nearby. . . . ‘he
had enough ammo to kill everyone in that terminal.’”54 The
shooting, and resulting chaos, sparked an investigation into air-
ports’ emergency protocols.55 The investigation revealed poor
communication and coordination between agencies and emer-
gency personnel, which is believed to have caused delays in
47 Tim Cushing, TSA’s $1 Billion ‘Behavioral Detection’ Program Only Slightly More








50 Kate Mather & Richard Winton, Federal Prosecutors to Seek Death Penalty in Fa-
tal LAX Shooting, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2015, 7:22 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
local/crime/la-me-lax-shooting-20150103-story.html [https://perma.cc/3QJ9-PY
6W]; see Matt Hamilton, LAX Shooter’s Plea Agreement Reveals He Did Not Consider
Himself a Terrorist, But a ‘Patriot’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www
.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lax-shooter-guilty-plea-20160901-snap-story
.html [https://perma.cc/S2WP-MP65].
51 Mather & Winton, supra note 50.
52 LAX Shooting, supra note 48.
53 Mather & Winton, supra note 50.
54 LAX Shooting, supra note 48.
55 Mather & Winton, supra note 50.
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bringing aid to victims and caused issues with evacuation.56 In
response, Congress passed and President Barack Obama signed
into law the Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act of 2015,57
which will be discussed further in Part II.
Another blow to the TSA came with the online publishing of
the master keys for TSA-approved luggage locks.58 On Novem-
ber 24, 2014, after The Washington Post published a high-resolu-
tion picture of the master keys, a security researcher published
the 3D printing files to GitHub,59 an online hosting service for
software code and application development. Now anyone with a
3D printer can print exact replicas.60 According to TSA spokes-
person Mike England, the TSA’s stance was that “[t]he reported
ability to create keys for TSA-approved suitcase locks from a digi-
tal image does not create a threat to aviation security . . . . These
consumer products are ‘peace of mind’ devices, not part of
TSA’s aviation security regime.”61 The TSA may be right in ex-
pressing no aviation security concern that the copied master
keys could allow for items to be stolen from luggage, but there
should be a concern that the copied master keys could allow for
items to be placed in luggage, specifically hazardous items. The
agency should also be concerned that such a breach occurred
because it is well within the realm of possibility that the next
release of information could be fatal to TSA’s aviation security
regime.
Finally, threats to our security can come from inabilities to
detect threats, as evidenced by covert testing done by the Inspec-
tor General in May and September 201562 and by TSA employ-
56 Id.
57 Examining Critical Security Measures, supra note 28, at 1–3 (opening statement
of Rep. John Katko, Chairman, Subcomm. on Transp. Sec.).
58 Timothy Geigner, Why Backdoors Always Suck: The TSA Travel Locks Were




59 3D Reproduction of TSA Master Keys, GITHUB, https://github.com/Xyl2k/
TSA-Travel-Sentry-master-keys [https://perma.cc/G2FU-5XWA].
60 Swati Khandelwal, Lockpickers 3D-Printed Master Key for TSA Luggage Locks and
BluePrint Leaked Online, THE HACKER NEWS (Sept. 10, 2015), http://thehacker
news.com/2015/09/tsa-master-keys-3d-printed.html [https://perma.cc/4S4T-
JPW9].
61 Geigner, supra note 58.
62 See TSA: Security Gaps, supra note 20, at 2–3 (statement of John Roth, Inspec-
tor General, Department of Homeland Security).
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ing seventy-three workers with alleged terrorist ties.63 The
testing, which revealed TSA’s security shortcomings, was the fi-
nal straw leading to the current state of political and public pres-
sure to reform the agency that is supposed to keep our nation
safe.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) regularly tests the
TSA and the effectiveness of its security protocols, typically using
Homeland Security Red Teams to pose as passengers and try to
get potential weapons through security checkpoints.64 The re-
port for the most recent testing is classified, but according to the
Inspector General the results were “disappointing and troub-
ling.”65 Undercover agents carrying fake firearms and bombs
made it through security in sixty-seven of seventy tests.66 Despite
these obviously negative findings, TSA claims that it prevented
about 119,000 dangerous items from being carried onto air-
planes during the 2015 fiscal year.67 Also, the White House Press
Secretary, Josh Earnest, stated that the President has full confi-
dence in the agency despite its failures in the covert testing, say-
ing that TSA agents “do very important work that continue[s] to
protect the American people and continue[s] to protect the
American aviation system.”68 Earnest further stated that the TSA
uses a multi-layer security approach screening individual passen-
63 See Svati Kirsten Narula, The TSA Failed to Spot 73 Aviation Workers on the US
Government’s Terrorism Watchlist, QUARTZ (June 9, 2015), http://qz.com/423476/
the-tsa-failed-to-spot-73-aviation-workers-on-the-us-governments-terrorism-watch
list/ [https://perma.cc/ZCF3-GFK2].
64 Justin Fishel et al., EXCLUSIVE: Undercover DHS Tests Find Security Failures at
US Airports, ABC NEWS (June 1, 2015, 7:04 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/ex-
clusive-undercover-dhs-tests-find-widespread-security-failures/story?id=31434881
[https://perma.cc/M2KC-P64C].
65 TSA: Security Gaps, supra note 20, at 2–3 (statement of John Roth, Inspector
General, Department of Homeland Security); Nicholas C. Fondacaro, Classified
TSA Investigation Shows Gaping Holes in Security System, WATCHDOG (Nov. 4, 2015),
http://watchdog.org/245667/tsa-investigation-hearing-security/ [https://perma
.cc/F8DQ-H4S8].
66 Keith Laing, Lawmakers Press TSA on ‘Alarming’ Airport Security Gaps, THE HILL
(Nov. 3, 2015, 6:42 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/259042-law
makers-press-tsa-on-alarming-airport-security-gaps [https://perma.cc/4ZLZ-72
HR].
67 Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act: Examining Remaining Challenges,
supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Jill Vaughan, Assistant Administrator, Transporta-
tion Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security).
68 Press Briefing, Josh Earnest, Press Sec’y, The White House Office of the
Press Sec’y, Daily Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 6/2/15 (June 2,
2015, 12:56 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/02/
daily-press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-6215 [https://perma.cc/GB23-3V
XK].
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gers at the checkpoint is only one layer.69 The message was effec-
tively that the multi-layer approach makes failure in one layer
acceptable because the other layers will filter out the mistakes of
the failed layer.70 On the contrary, we should be concerned with
any failure in our aviation security measures, work to eliminate
such failures, and not be content with assuming that a different
security layer would protect us if there were a real threat.
Inspector General John Roth appears not to share the same
lack of concern expressed by the White House.71 Roth stated
that the results were consistent for each airport tested and that
“[i]t would be misleading to minimize the rigor of our testing,
or to imply that our testing was not an accurate reflection of the
effectiveness of the totality of aviation security.”72 Roth found
obvious technology and procedural failures, in addition to obvi-
ous human error,73 which will all be discussed thoroughly in
Part II. Roth also stated that layers of security were “simply miss-
ing,”74 which knocks a gaping hole into the White House Press
Secretary’s idea that TSA’s multi-layer approach can protect us if
one layer fails.75 Other layers of security cannot maintain avia-
tion safety if they are nonexistent.
Just one month after the testing results were released, a DHS
report exposed another TSA blunder where seventy-three avia-
tion employees with terrorist ties had been missed in TSA’s vet-
ting process.76 TSA uses another multi-layer process to vet its
aviation workers, which includes checking applications and cre-
dentials and regularly comparing names of workers with secured
access at commercial airports to names on the Consolidated
Terrorist Watchlist.77 But the process fell short in that initial
stage as TSA lacked the control to ensure that aviation workers
“1) had not committed crimes that would disqualify them from
having unescorted access to secure airports area[s], and 2) had
lawful status and were authorized to work in the United
69 Id.
70 See id.
71 See TSA: Security Gaps, supra note 20, at 3 (statement of John Roth, Inspector




75 See Press Briefing, Josh Earnest, supra note 68.
76 See Narula, supra note 63.
77 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-15-98, TSA
CAN IMPROVE AVIATION WORKER VETTING (2015), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/as
sets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-98_Jun15.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS2W-LJZW].
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States.”78 TSA had been relying on airport personnel to perform
such checks.79 Further, the report found that TSA’s records
used to compare names against the watchlists were incomplete
and inaccurate, and TSA reportedly did not have full access to
the watchlists.80 DHS recommended that TSA request and re-
view additional watchlist data, require that airports improve ver-
ification of the work eligibility of applicants, revoke credentials
when the right to work expires, and improve the quality of vet-
ting data.81
With the potential risks, actual risks, and reports of TSA inef-
fectiveness, it is not surprising that there are rising public and
political pressures to reform the agency charged with keeping
the skies, and our country, safe.
II. CURRENT AVIATION SECURITY LAWS AND
REGULATIONS AND PROJECTED CHANGES
A. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT SECURITY MEASURES AND
ISSUES TSA IS FACING
Under TSA’s current screening protocol, TSA employs a risk-
based, technology-driven approach.82 The risk-based processes
include TSA officers questioning passengers about their travel,
employing random screening techniques, and utilizing specific
risk-based programs.83 One such program is Secure Flight, a
prescreening program that identifies high-risk and low-risk trav-
elers prior to their arrival at the airport by comparing their per-
sonal information to trusted traveler lists and watchlists,
including FBI’s No Fly List and Center for Disease Control’s
(CDC) Do Not Board List.84 The technology processes include
“millimeter wave advanced imaging technology and walk-
through metal detectors.”85 The millimeter wave technology
screens for both metallic and non-metallic weapons or explo-
sives hidden under clothes, but passengers can decline this
screening unless their boarding pass specifically requires it from
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2.
81 Id. at 3.
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the Secure Flight results.86 If passengers cannot or choose not to
use the millimeter wave technology or the walk-through metal
detector, TSA agents will follow a traditional pat-down
procedure.87
But the extensive TSA protocol is not perfect, as evidenced by
the alarming testing results.88 Within the month of the release
of the testing results, the Senate confirmed a new administrator,
Peter Neffenger, with only one dissenting vote.89 Neffenger then
somewhat defended the results of the testing, stating that it “was
not a deliberate test of the entire system and while there were
areas for improvement noted by the Inspector General—with
which [agency officials] concurred—that the system as a whole
remains effective and, as a result of this series of tests, has only
gotten stronger.”90 Nevertheless, the Secretary of DHS sum-
moned top TSA leadership and required an immediate plan of
action to correct deficiencies.91 The plan put forward by DHS
and TSA called for security improvement in three areas: tech-
nology, personnel, and procedures.92 Inspector General John
Roth stated: “This plan is appropriate because the checkpoint
must be considered as a single system: the most effective tech-
nology is useless without the right personnel, and the personnel
need to be guided by the appropriate procedures. Unless all
three elements are operating effectively, the checkpoint will not
be effective.”93
Security is not a partisan issue, so Democrats and Republicans
can, and do, work together to pass meaningful legislation that
86 Id.
87 Id. Pat-downs can be completed in private, if requested, with a companion of
choice. Id. Pat-downs may also be required if a passenger sets off an alarm on any
of the security equipment. Id.
88 See TSA: Security Gaps, supra note 20, at 3 (statement of John Roth, Inspector
General, Department of Homeland Security).
89 Nicole Duran, Senate Confirms New Leader for Dysfunctional TSA, WASH. EXAM-
INER (June 22, 2015, 8:27 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate-con
firms-new-leader-for-dysfunctional-tsa/article/2566810 [https://perma.cc/DD
Z8-ZVUS].
90 See TSA: Security Gaps, supra note 20, at 3 (statement of Peter Neffenger,
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Home-
land Security).
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will make a difference.94 Current laws that have been passed in-
clude Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act of 201595 and
Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act (TSARA).96
Since the testing failures, the House of Representatives has
unanimously passed more reform legislation.97 Among the bills
passed are H.R. 2750, Improved Security Vetting for Aviation
Workers Act; H.R. 2843, TSA PreCheck Expansion Act; H.R.
2127, Securing Expedited Screening Act; H.R. 3102, Airport Ac-
cess Control Security Improvement Act; and H.R. 2770, Keeping
Our Travelers Safe and Secure Act.98 Each, or a similar version,
is expected to become law given the seriousness of the deficien-
cies and vulnerabilities of the TSA’s current protocols and the
bipartisan support behind them.99 There are also several pro-
grams created by the agency itself to battle the missing security
processes, which the agency is entitled to do under its adminis-
trative authority. These include Secure Flight, PreCheck, and
Managed Inclusion.
B. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS, LEGISLATION,
AND FUTURE INVESTMENTS
TSA must stay at the forefront of technological advances to
stay a step ahead of the terrorist threats that confront the coun-
try. Understanding how the new technology works and how it
can make air travel safer is essential to TSA’s mission.
TSARA was signed into law on December 18, 2014, after pass-
ing both chambers of Congress unanimously.100 The act gener-
ally aims to achieve greater transparency and accountability for
94 See Examining Critical Security Measures, supra note 28, at 1 (opening state-
ment of Rep. John Katko, Chairman, Subcomm. on Transp. Sec.).
95 Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act of 2015, 49 U.S.C. § 44903 (2015).
96 Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 113-245, 128
Stat. 2871 (2014).
97 Daniel Wilson, House Passes Bills Tightening TSA Screening Processes, LAW 360
(July 27, 2015, 8:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/683686/house-passes-
bills-tightening-tsa-screening-processes [https://perma.cc/H9Q2-LLKM].
98 Id.
99 See Examining Critical Security Measures, supra note 28, at 1 (opening state-
ment of Rep. John Katko, Chairman, Subcomm. on Transp. Sec.); Wilson, supra
note 97.
100 Anthony Kimery, Infrastructure Security TSA Reform Bill Signed into Law by
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the TSA.101 Specifically, it requires the TSA to “develop and
share with the public a strategic 5-year technology investment
plan; share key information with Congress on technology acqui-
sitions, including cost overruns, delays, or technical failures
within [thirty] days of identifying the problem; establish princi-
ples for managing equipment in inventory to eliminate expen-
sive storage of unusable or outdated technologies; and report
on its goals for contracting with small businesses.”102 The strate-
gic 5-year technology investment plan had to be developed and
submitted to Congress within 180 days from enactment.103 TSA
must also, under this law, identify what security measures are
and will be taken to protect the technology “from physical or
cyber theft, diversion, sabotage[,] or attack.”104
By August 2015, TSA had deployed 15,000 units of security
technology to airports around the country.105 In January 2016, a
little more than a year after the law’s enactment, the Subcom-
mittee on Transportation Security under the House Committee
on Homeland Security held a hearing to determine the TSA’s
progress in implementing the requirements of TSARA.106 Sub-
committee Chairman John Katko stated concern that “bureau-
cracy and stagnation are preventing TSA and [DHS] from being
responsive to legitimate security threats facing our nation.”107
The hearing revealed immature technology leading to failures
on eleven of twenty-two passenger and baggage screening sys-
tems tested.108 TSA is also working with DHS Science and Tech-
nology (S&T) to ensure that “homeland security technologies
are reliable, interoperable[,] and effective.”109 S&T provides the
testing and evaluation oversight for DHS programs, which





105 Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act: Examining Remaining Challenges,
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ample, if a vendor of the proposed technology fails testing by
S&T, it increases costs to the government and TSA.111 TSA’s so-
lution is implementing a Third Party Test Program in December
2016, which will allow the technology to be refined by an outside
entity before it enters TSA’s official formal testing and
evaluation.112
The main technology breakthrough employed by TSA is its
millimeter wave advanced imaging technology (AIT). These sys-
tems are full body scanners that reproduce images of passen-
gers’ bodies that are analyzed by image operators “to identify
objects or anomalies that could pose a threat to an aircraft or to
the traveling public.”113 Software was added to protect the pri-
vacy of passengers being scanned, which will be discussed fur-
ther in Part III.114 These scanners can detect metallic and non-
metallic objects and liquids without physically touching passen-
gers, which makes them desirable compared to past screening
techniques, such as pat-downs.115 But these systems are only ef-
fective if they can detect threats and if the operators can resolve
or respond to detected threats.116 The issue of the operators’
abilities will be discussed in the next section.
C. ISSUES, CURRENT POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS, AND PROJECTED
CHANGES FOR TSA PERSONNEL
TSA personnel must make real-time assessments of threats
and risks, implement the procedures, and analyze technological
detections. Ultimately, personnel keep TSA’s multi-layer security
approach functioning; if personnel do not do their job effec-
tively, the remaining layers break down as well.
Even if AIT scanners detect every threatening or dangerous
object on passengers attempting to board an aircraft, such de-
tection is irrelevant if the TSA agents analyzing the data are una-
111 Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act: Examining Remaining Challenges,
supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Jill Vaughan, Assistant Administrator, Transporta-
tion Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security).
112 Id.; Sutherland, supra note 106.
113 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-559T, AVIATION SECURITY: TSA
HAS TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF KEY PROGRAMS, BUT ADDITIONAL AC-
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ble to understand or resolve the threat detected.117 Testing
completed by TSA to determine human error and effectiveness
of the technology with human operators has proved
inconclusive.118
Although Managed Inclusion, discussed further in the next
section, is discontinued, its parts are still being used as security
layers: the Behavior Detection and Analysis Program and the Na-
tional Explosives Detection Canine Team Program
(NEDCTP).119 Under the Behavior Detection and Analysis Pro-
gram, BDOs identify passengers who potentially pose a risk by
observing behaviors such as stress, fear, or deception.120 If a pas-
senger is identified, he or she is referred to additional screen-
ing, and if such screening yields further cause for concern, the
passenger is referred to law enforcement.121 TSA has worked to
improve BDO training so that each officer understands which
behaviors to detect, but testing is still being conducted to deter-
mine the effectiveness of this type of screening.122
The NEDCTP enlists 800 canine teams—a canine and its han-
dler—to sniff passengers and baggage to detect explosives or
other residue.123 In assessing the effectiveness of NEDCTP, TSA
“did not analyze the [test] results beyond the pass and fail
rates,” and therefore missed an opportunity to determine if the
canine teams were more effective at detecting certain types of
explosives or if different or additional training could improve
the deficiencies.124 But these canine teams are surprisingly effec-
tive and have been described as “one of the most reliable secur-
ity tools that exist today,” according to North Carolina
Representative Richard Hudson, Chairman of the House Sub-
committee on Transportation Security.125 Screening by canines
117 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-678T, AVIATION SECURITY:
TSA HAS TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF KEY PROGRAMS, BUT ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS ARE NEEDED (2015), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-678T
[https://perma.cc/F8YA-NHZQ].
118 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-199T, AVIATION SECURITY: IM-
PROVED TESTING, EVALUATION, AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT COULD ENHANCE
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is a “less invasive, highly effective approach” and can be ex-
panded as a “primary layer of security” with common standards
across federal, state, local, and private-sector explosive detection
canine teams.126 Canine teams, and law enforcement and canine
handlers, also serve as an important piece of Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR), which means that they can
eliminate terrorist threats by virtue of being seen.127 Unfortu-
nately, the teams are expensive, costing taxpayers roughly
$18,000 in start-up costs for each canine team.128
Finally, TSA’s Aviation Workers program completes security
threat assessments for all applicants that apply for unescorted
access to secure areas, including a thorough background check
with the help of airport operators and the FBI.129 After TSA
failed to detect seventy-three workers with terrorist ties as men-
tioned in Part I, the TSA and FBI have worked together to re-
solve the lack of complete information available to the TSA for
its vetting process.130 Both agencies have secured state records
of criminal history and worked to expand and complete existing
records for use with TSA’s vetting procedures.131
D. LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS
IN TSA PROCEDURES
Proper procedures are a vital part of TSA success because they
outline how personnel and technology should work together
and how TSA’s multi-layer security platform ought to function.
A breakdown in procedures can mean a breakdown for the en-
tire system.
TSA’s PreCheck, as introduced previously, is an expedited
screening process for pre-approved passengers.132 Prior to this
(2014), https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-utilizing-
canine-teams-detect-explosives-and-mitigate-threats/ [https://perma.cc/QT6J-24
LH] (opening statement of Rep. Richard Hudson, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Transp. Sec.).
126 Id. at 2.
127 Id. at 8 (statement of Melanie Harvey, Director, Threat Assessment Division,
Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security).
128 Id. at 4–5 (statement of Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member, H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec.).
129 GAO-15-559T, supra note 113.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-465T, AVIATION SECURITY:
TSA’S MANAGED INCLUSION PROCESS EXPANDS PASSENGER EXPEDITED SCREENING,
BUT TSA HAS NOT TESTED ITS SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS (2015), http://www.gao
.gov/products/GAO-15-465T [https://perma.cc/6HJJ-NNXS].
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program, TSA employed the same level of screening for all pas-
sengers, without regard to the risk imposed by each passen-
ger.133 When TSA introduced expedited screening, it was
reserved for passengers age twelve and younger, passengers age
seventy-five and older, and certain flight crew.134 It then ex-
panded to other groups, such as “members of the U.S. armed
forces, Congressional Medal of Honor Society Members, mem-
bers of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, and Members
of Congress.”135 The application process outlined above began
in December 2013.136
TSA’s Managed Inclusion program started in November
2012137 to pre-screen passengers with observation techniques by
BDOs and canine units, but it received poor reviews and has
been discontinued.138 The program began as a way to alleviate
long waits in standard screening lines by using an underutilized
expedited PreCheck lane, but its use expanded to include other
unjustified purposes.139 Some argue that the program was pri-
marily used as advertising for PreCheck to encourage passengers
to enroll, which was effectively confirmed by former administra-
tor of TSA, John Pistole, in a hearing before the Appropriations
Committee for the 2015 fiscal year.140 Passengers qualify as low-
risk under Managed Inclusion on a flight-by-flight basis, and Pis-
tole stated that it was “like we are doing a free sample for people
to encourage them to sign up for TSA PreCheck.”141
Further, a report from the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) found that TSA had not scientifically proven that the
133 GAO-15-559T, supra note 113.
134 GAO-15-465T, supra note 132.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-150, AVIATION SECURITY: RAPID
GROWTH IN EXPEDITED PASSENGER SCREENING HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO PLAN EFFEC-
TIVE SECURITY ASSESSMENTS (2014), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-150
[https://perma.cc/L9DW-B3XX].
138 Grant Martin, TSA Ends Precheck Free Rides with Shut Down of Managed Inclu-
sion Program, SKIFT (Sept. 18, 2015, 7:20 AM), http://skift.com/2015/09/18/tsa-
ends-precheck-free-rides-with-shut-down-of-managed-inclusion-program/ [https:/
/perma.cc/N2C4-BFB3].
139 See GAO-15-150, supra note 137.
140 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for 2015: Hearing Before Sub-
comm. on Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 35 (2014),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=758336 [https://perma.cc/K32Q-3J99] (state-
ment of John Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration.,
Department of Homeland Security).
141 Id.
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BDOs could “reliably and effectively identify high-risk passen-
gers who may pose a threat to the U.S. aviation system.”142 TSA’s
testing was laden with issues, including selecting airports with-
out randomization, collecting data unevenly, and failing to get
an adequate sample size.143 Under established evaluation tech-
niques for TSA’s programs, TSA must collect data that is suffi-
ciently free of bias or error to prove the effectiveness of its
procedures.144 Now, TSA is focused on increasing enrollment in
PreCheck rather than allowing “low-risk” travelers to uses its
benefits without paying.
Secure Flight, another TSA program to identify high-risk pas-
sengers, has evolved since its introduction in 2009.145 Previously,
the program identified high-risk passengers prior to their arrival
at the airport by comparing their credentials to the No Fly List,
compiled by the FBI and composed of individuals with known
terrorist ties, and the Selectee List, composed of individuals that
required enhanced screening.146 Subsequent improvements in
the program provided access to a greater number of databases
with more complete information, such as Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB), which allowed the TSA to identify passengers
as high-risk, low-risk, and unknown risk.147 These improvements
led to the creation of PreCheck.
However, the GAO identified two major errors with Secure
Flight: matching errors and mistakes at screening check-
points.148 To address system-matching errors, GAO recom-
mended that TSA create a mechanism to “systematically
document the number and causes of the Secure Flight system’s
matching errors” for the Match Review Board to use to investi-
gate causes and implement changes to improve Secure Flight.149
TSA has created the process as recommended but is still finaliz-
ing how the process will improve the overall program.150 The
mistakes at the screening checkpoints were caused by TSA per-
sonnel not ensuring that “passengers receive a level of screening
that corresponds to the level of risk determined by Secure
142 GAO-15-465T, supra note 132.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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Flight.”151 TSA has no process in place to determine the root
causes of the errors and has yet to create one.152 Secure Flight
cannot be an effective procedure to eliminate threats if TSA per-
sonnel cannot implement its findings when passengers are be-
ing submitted for screening.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TSA REFORM ON
PASSENGERS AND THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Representative John Katko, who has sponsored and advocated
most of the TSA reform bills, has urged airport stakeholders,
passengers, airlines, law enforcement, emergency first respond-
ers, and TSA to “work together to exercise plans and improve
coordination among relevant entities.”153 But at what cost must
passengers comply with TSA protocol aimed at maintaining our
national security? And to what degree are airlines expected, and
needed, to participate in the security process?
A. WHAT PASSENGERS SHOULD EXPECT
One of the biggest complaints from passengers is the privacy
concern of TSA’s use of AIT.154 These scanners generate images
of scanned passengers to identify threats, but many passengers
raised privacy concerns, claiming that the generated image was a
nude picture of each passenger, which, unsurprisingly, caused
severe resistance to the new technology.155 TSA began develop-
ing privacy software called Automated Target Recognition
(ATR),156 and Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Re-
form Act of 2012157 that required all AIT scanners to be
equipped with ATR by June 2012, later changed to May 2013.158
TSA now has a disclaimer on its website that the imaging pro-
duced by AIT “auto-detects potential threats by indicating their
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155 Redfern v. Napolitano, 727 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013).
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11 (2012).
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159 Security Screening, supra note 82.
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Several cases had been filed challenging the constitutionality
of the AIT scanners, alleging that the scanners violated the
Fourth Amendment and passengers’ rights to privacy, but the
most recent case was dismissed as moot after the AIT scanners
had been fitted with ATR software.160 The interest of protecting
against terrorism seemed compelling enough for most courts to
justify such “searches,” but none of the cases actually dove into
that analysis.161 There is a gap in the jurisprudence, leaving
room to argue that TSA procedures and technology are uncon-
stitutional if they become more intrusive than they are today.162
Another issue with TSA’s procedures as they relate to passen-
gers is the lack of flexibility and understanding for non-tradi-
tional situations in security screening. For example, a man sued
the TSA and its agents after he was arrested for “creating a pub-
lic disturbance” at Richmond International Airport on Decem-
ber 30, 2010.163 The plaintiff, Aaron Tobey, believed that AIT
screening was unconstitutional and had written the text of the
Fourth Amendment on his chest in silent protest.164 When he
was selected for enhanced screening with the AIT scanner, To-
bey removed his sweatpants and t-shirt, revealing the text, and
although he was told by the TSA agent that he need not remove
his clothes, he stated that he “wished to express his view” that
the enhanced screening was unconstitutional.165 The agent then
radioed for assistance and Tobey was arrested without further
question, despite that he had remained calm and did not refuse
any TSA request.166 Tobey was later charged with disorderly con-
duct in a public place, but the charges were dismissed and To-
bey was permitted to board his flight without further incident,
but he had been held over an hour.167
The Court held that Tobey’s actions may have been “bizarre,”
but that was not enough to justify an arrest as bizarre behavior
does not equal disruptive behavior.168 It was unreasonable for
Tobey to be arrested merely because he acted in an unfamiliar
way toward the TSA security agents.169 The Court noted that
160 See, e.g., Redfern, 727 F.3d at 77.
161 See Ruskai, 775 F.3d at 70, 77; Redfern, 727 F.3d at 80.
162 See Ruskai, 775 F.3d at 70, 77; Redfern, 727 F.3d at 80.
163 Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 383–84 (4th Cir. 2013).
164 Id. at 384.
165 Id. at 383–84.
166 Id. at 384.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 388.
169 See id.
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TSA regulations prohibit any person from “interfer[ing] with
. . . [TSA] screening personnel in the performance of their du-
ties,”170 or “attempt[ing] to circumvent . . . any security system,
measure, or procedure.”171 But Tobey had not violated either
provision.172 This case serves as a reminder to TSA that it and its
agents are required to behave reasonably in a variety of poten-
tial circumstances that may arise in an airport, and courts are
not deferential to TSA action merely because airport security is
a compelling interest.
The dissent, however, argued that an agent who faithfully per-
forms his duty to fulfill TSA’s mission to protect against terror-
ism should be shielded from liability for infringing on one
passenger’s rights.173 That is certainly a persuasive view given the
severe threats that TSA must protect us from, but the majority
sent a clear message that TSA agents must be trained to assess
the difference between a harmless passenger exhibiting bizarre
or unconventional behavior and a passenger who poses a real
risk or threat to national security.174
TSA is keenly aware of its less-than-sterling reputation and has
created a program to intercept and address passenger concerns.
Under current TSA policies, passengers may lodge complaints
through the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP).175
Common issues for which passengers should apply for TRIP in-
clude inability to print a boarding pass, denied or delayed
boarding, denied or delayed entry or exit from the country, and
continuous referral to additional screening.176 Any aggrieved
passenger must first file a complaint with the TSA through this
program before challenging TSA’s security procedures in
court.177
The TSA legislation is not only important to understand as it
relates to passengers, but also as it relates to passenger luggage.
Every month, roughly 350 individuals question the TSA for “sins
against their luggage,” resulting in a need for the agency to be
170 49 C.F.R. § 1540.109 (2016).
171 49 C.F.R. § 1540.105 (2016); Tobey, 706 F.3d at 389.
172 See Tobey, 706 F.3d at 389.
173 Id. at 394–95 (Wilkinson, J. dissenting).
174 See id. at 386–89 (majority opinion).




177 See 49 U.S.C.S. 46110(d).
2016] SAFETY IN THE SKY 313
transparent with its handling of baggage.178 An article published
by The Washington Post explains the path luggage takes after leav-
ing the checked bag counter in an effort to provide that trans-
parency.179 The bags typically move along several conveyor belts
and through a variety of scanners, and TSA agents rarely need
to touch or open items with the “slick new systems to keep ter-
rorist explosives off airplanes.”180 However, any bag that is
opened includes a notification to make the passenger aware and
feel secure knowing that the TSA took appropriate measures to
keep air travel safe.181
Finally, DHS wants to bring the public on board with its mis-
sion to protect national security with its If You See Something,
Say Something™ campaign.182 The campaign seeks to raise pub-
lic awareness about suspicious activities related to terrorism and
how to report them.183 It is an extremely important campaign
for airports where TSA relies on passengers to report unat-
tended baggage, persons in possession of potentially dangerous
items, or persons in restricted areas.184
Discrimination in screening practices is also a concern for
some travelers. The biggest targets for these complaints are the
BDOs, who face allegations of racial profiling when selecting mi-
norities for enhanced screening.185 TSA claims that “[r]acial
profiling is not tolerated,” but it is still an issue that gets signifi-
cant coverage whenever an allegation is made.186
178 Ashley Halsey III, The Secret Life of Baggage: Where Does Your Luggage Go at the
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Luckily for frequent flyers, the goal and implementation of
current and proposed TSA reform legislation is to subject most
passengers to less intrusive screening,187 which is evidenced by
TSA’s yearly publication about the percentage of passengers
who received some type of expedited screening.188 DHS and
TSA are acutely aware of their reputation of tiptoeing the line
between appropriate searches and inappropriate intrusions on
privacy, and they are highly interested in changing the conversa-
tion.189 It is true that there are passengers who pose an affirma-
tive risk to air travel. TSA is working to improve its processes so
that it is only using intrusive screening on those passengers who
might pose a risk to air safety. If TSA is successful in its reform,
we will see less litigation against the agency for its transgressions
and more praise in the media for its success in preventing secur-
ity breaches.
B. THE IMPACT ON AIRLINES AND THE INDUSTRY
TSA is highly important to the airlines because every airplane
is safer when TSA personnel carefully screen each passenger
and oncoming bag or item. TSA and the airlines have to work
together for security on issues such as passenger screening and
baggage safety.
With TSA programs such as Secure Flight and PreCheck, air-
lines have to work with TSA to provide its passenger lists prior to
passengers arriving at the airports.190 The security systems also
make it necessary to open very few bags to check for prohibited
items, resulting in happier passengers when their luggage ar-
rives safely without needing inspection.191 The changes being
panel.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QZ3G-S4TH]; Amy McKeever, Sikh Actor
Waris Ahluwalia is Taking a Stand Against Airport Discrimination, TRAVEL + LEISURE
(Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.travelandleisure.com/articles/waris-ahluwalia-aero
mexico-discrimination [https://perma.cc/76XF-7NN6].
187 See Wilson, supra note 97.
188 See TSA 2015 Year in Review, supra note 4.
189 See, e.g., Warner Todd Huston, TSA Spokesperson Tweets Photo of Passenger’s
Bag Carrying $75K in Cash, BREITBART (July 2, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/
big-government/2015/07/02/tsa-spokesperson-tweets-photo-of-passengers-bag-
carrying-75k-in-cash/ [https://perma.cc/86NP-2QGK]; Abby Reed, Local Woman
Says New TSA Screenings Invade Privacy, NEWSWEST9.COM (Nov. 5, 2010), http://
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190 GAO-15-150, supra note 137.
191 See Halsey, supra note 178.
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implemented are positive for the airline industry and should
continue.
If the TSA is doing its job effectively, the air travel process is
smoother, more enjoyable, and safer for every passenger, which
increases the likelihood that passengers will fly again. Therefore,
airlines rely on TSA protocols to keep their customers happy
and coming back. Because failures in TSA security protocol dis-
courage the public from utilizing air travel, the industry has a
huge stake in TSA’s success. It is in the airline industry’s best
interest to help TSA to accomplish its goals. When a terrorist
attacks a plane, the plane and the airline make the news; the
TSA agent that allowed the threat to pass through security or
the airport staff that failed to detect the threat almost never do.
Therefore, TSA’s success has a direct effect on airlines and the
industry’s prosperity.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROJECTIONS FOR
FUTURE TSA LEGISLATION AND ACTION
TSA, DHS, Congress, and the public are grasping for better
ways to improve security and eliminate risks but decrease the
burden and inconvenience on passengers who pose no threat to
aviation security. Legislation is not enough to create, change,
and improve security. The agency must take action, and agency
employees must meet higher expectations if TSA is ever to be
thought of as more than a smoke screen.
A. CORRECTING HUMAN ERROR
One of the basic improvements to be made is with employee
training. Human error issues were prevalent across the failures
in every other area. Therefore, to improve this would improve
the system as a whole.192 As mentioned regarding Secure Flight,
TSA has yet to design a plan to combat the human error issues
in implementing the Secure Flight protocol for passengers at
the security checkpoints.193 This is extremely alarming because
it effectively renders the Secure Flight program irrelevant when
TSA personnel cannot enforce its findings.
It seems at the most basic level that TSA screeners must be-
come accustomed to verifying the Secure Flight designation on
each passenger’s boarding pass when they verify the passenger’s
identity and flight information on the ticket as well. Repetition
192 See supra Part II.
193 See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
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would be key. If each TSA officer checks the same places on
each boarding pass for each passenger repeatedly, it would be-
come a habit. Thus, it would be very unlikely that a TSA agent
would miss such crucial information when it matters.
The program should also give TSA agents at the checkpoint a
warning about possibilities of a threat, which would likely in-
crease agents’ effectiveness in screening because they would be
more deliberate and careful in their searches. If every day and
every search is monotonous, repetitive, and uneventful, the care-
fully selected procedures fall apart and the technology serves no
purpose. The success of TSA depends on its personnel imple-
menting all procedures without variation and utilizing all tech-
nology without missing detections.
B. EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF CANINE TEAMS
Another area of improvement is with the usage of canine
teams. Given the positive findings of the effectiveness of explo-
sive detection canine teams,194 TSA should focus on securing
the resources for future deployment of more canine teams.195
With more canine teams comes more training and job opportu-
nities within the TSA. It may be expensive, but the TSA, and the
agencies responsible for testing it, should broaden testing spec-
trums and results to better define the role that canine teams
could play in aviation security.196 Under the same testing proce-
dures, more results could be obtained by analyzing recurring
patterns of each test and comparing results over time. Each ca-
nine team is an expensive investment,197 but the agency should
be investing in successful security techniques, not just the new-
est technology without training personnel how to use it. When
balancing expense against national security, all reasonable costs
should be absorbed to ensure the safety of the country.
194 See Andrea Sachs, Don’t Mind the Wet Nose: TSA Enlists More Dogs to Screen
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C. INCREASED TESTING
Finally, the biggest improvement TSA can make is to increase
testing procedures and testing frequency. While this may be ex-
pensive for an agency that already receives $8 billion tax dollars
per year,198 it would be worth the cost.
Research shows that employee behavior changes and produc-
tivity increases when employees know they are being watched.199
This theory could be applied to TSA agents if they know they are
being tested. If every TSA employee came into work each day
expecting to be tested or scrutinized, each would be alert, in-
tently performing his or her duties to be the one agent that
catches the threat being tested. The anticipation of testing or
scrutiny would make TSA personnel more careful with every pas-
senger as they would be unsure who was watching and when,
which would result in greater effectiveness and less human error
from lack of attention. The increased testing could be up to one
day of testing per month, but if the employees do not know
when the testing will take place, they will have to be careful,
prepared, and diligent each day when screening passengers. But
just threatening more testing may not be enough; the TSA
would need to implement and publicize the repercussions of
failing a test to its employees.
Aquatics is an industry that employs this type of frequent test-
ing. Lifeguards must pass an aquatics test to be certified, and
they must complete frequent audits to test their life-saving skills
in real-time scenarios.200 These audits are effective for educa-
tion, suggestions, simple implementation of changes, and rein-
forcement of skills and procedures.201 For maximum
effectiveness and increased overall safety, the audits should be
performed often and employ a variety of scenarios so the life-
guards do not identify the situation as a test.202 The same logic
could be applied to testing of TSA agents, and the consequences
198 Katie Pavlich, Surprise: TSA Hasn’t Improved Since Failing 95 Percent of Security
Tests, TOWNHALL.COM (Nov. 4, 2015), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepav-
lich/2015/11/04/surprise-tsa-is-still-sucking-terribly-n2075370 [https://perma
.cc/48N2-DUJ9].
199 Hawthorne Effect, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclo
pedia.org/entry/Hawthorne_effect [https://perma.cc/ZLU4-4USD].
200 Deborah L. Vence, Feature Article—Safe in the Water, RECREATION MGMT.
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of failing are arguably just as great—the safety and security of
human lives are at stake.
One concern that may arise from increased testing might be
that fear of flying or of terrorism might increase if the public
sees more prohibited items being confiscated. It is foreseeable
that passengers may be uneasy if they are constantly seeing
weapons or other prohibited items discovered on undercover
agents administering the testing. However, the TSA can alleviate
this concern by publishing its testing frequency and protocols. It
is likely that passengers will feel much safer flying if they know
that TSA employees are tested regularly. Many passengers know
that now but have never seen it. Passengers would feel safer if
they could see the testing, and success, of the TSA and its proto-
cols when they travel through the nation’s airports. If passengers
feel safer, the pressure to reform the TSA and increase security
effectiveness will lessen because the public would view the
agency as successful in its purpose.
To have the number of personnel in place to implement such
measures at all of the commercial airports in the nation is a big
undertaking, but it is undoubtedly worth the cost when com-
pared with the reward—safer skies. Implementation costs would
be high, but it would likely be less costly long-term because
much of the expense would be start-up costs of hiring and train-
ing more testing agents. A new, comprehensive testing plan
could be implemented gradually as well, which would help with
the costs, and it would allow more of the TSA’s current budget
to go to additional training and improvement of current proto-
col and ensure less of the budget goes to new technology that
has not yet proven to be effective. As an added bonus, it would
create more jobs for many Americans, which the public and po-
litical officials would likely support.
Ultimately, there are many changes that can be made to im-
prove our security and lessen the burden that security measures
place on the non-threatening traveling public. It is the difficult
choice of deciding which changes to implement and when to
implement them that the public leaves in the hopefully capable
hands of government.
V. CONCLUSION
Increased security measures and technology should make air
travel safer and cause fewer headaches for travelers. There is al-
ways a way to improve aviation security, and we should be work-
ing together to accomplish that goal. However, just passing
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legislation is not the answer; members of Congress cannot write
this off as a “handled” issue and report back to their constitu-
ents for a pat on the back. To solve the security problem in this
country, we need to act, not talk about acting. To require action
under legislation is only the first step.
Testing more frequently and improving inefficiencies caused
by human error are the most important aspects to solving the
critical aviation safety issues that face the TSA. The agency was
created to make air travel safe in the United States. It has come
a long way since it began, but it will take activism and relentless
supervision from agency officers to make the skies safe. Hope-
fully, the TSA is well on its way.
